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I. INTRODUCTION
At common law, the employment relationship was deemed to be
terminable at the will of either the employer or the employee.' Ab-
sent a contractual agreement to the contrary, an employee could
quit at any time.2 Likewise, an employer could fire an employee for
good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.
3
With the passage of time, legislative enactments and judicial de-
cisions have eroded the at-will doctrine. For example, the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)4 prohibits employers from hiring and
firing employees on the basis of union membership;' Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) 6 prohibits discrimination in
the terms and conditions of employment because of an "individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;" 7 and the Age Dis-
1. See generally 53 Am. JUR.2D Master and Servant §§ 14-34 (1970).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1988).
5. Id. at § 158(b)(2).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
7. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(1).
1047
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crimination in Employment Act8 bars discrimination against those
over the age of forty.
These and other legislative enactments9 essentially constitute stat-
utory exceptions to the at-will doctrine by proscribing certain pre-
viously permissible employer conduct. Courts have also weakened
the at-will doctrine through the adoption of common-law excep-
tions. 10
In response to the weakening of the at-will rule, some employer
conduct has been forced "underground." Fearing liability, some em-
ployers have attempted to get around the various protective statutes
by inducing the unwanted employee to quit. This is typically ac-
complished by making the work place unpleasant to the employee
- unpleasant enough that the employee will quit rather than tolerate
the disagreeable conditions.
In order to thwart this tactic, courts have adopted the doctrine
of constructive discharge. The doctrine permits the courts to imply
a discharge when certain circumstances are shown. Although the
doctrine has attained widespread acceptance, there is disagreement
over what an employee must prove in order to be considered con-
structively discharged. Two standards have emerged in the federal
circuit courts of appeal, and the United States Supreme Court has
yet to settle the conflict between them. Likewise, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has not ruled on the issue. The states
that have ruled on the issue are also split on what standard to apply.
The purpose of this note is to analyze the competing standards
used in constructive discharge cases and suggest a standard which
West Virginia and other jurisdictions should follow. Part II examines
the two standards now used by the United States circuit courts of
appeal and a handful of states. Part III briefly discusses the current
status of West Virginia law. Finally, Part IV analyzes to what extent
the two dominant standards carry out the purpose of the constructive
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
9. See e.g., W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-1 (1985) (prohibiting discrimination against employees who
file workmen's compensation claims).
10. See e.g., Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (recognizing the public-
policy exception to the at-will rule).
[Vol. 931048
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CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
discharge doctrine, and recommends the approach which is most
consistent with the purposes of the constructive discharge doctrine.
II. THE COMPETING STANDARDS
Constructive discharge is a legal fiction that permits an em-
ployee's resignation to be treated as a firing when certain circum-
stances are present. As two commentators defined it,
constructive discharge means a discharge implied by the courts. No express or
actual discharge occurs; rather, the courts examine the circumstances surrounding
the employee's decision to quit or resign. If the decision was forced on the em-
ployee, the courts will deem it a constructive discharge and will treat the employee
as if he or she has been explicitly and directly discharged."
The doctrine first appeared in cases involving anti-discrimination
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. 12 The NLRA pro-
hibits an employer from discriminating against employees on the
basis of union membership. 13 The National Labor Relations Board
(Board),'14 recognizing that some employers might attempt to indi-
rectly discriminate against union members and sympathizers by mak-
ing their working conditions so intolerable that the employees would
resign, adopted the doctrine of constructive discharge to deal with
such situations.1 5 The doctrine was later absorbed by the courts into
cases involving discrimination under Title VII.16 The doctrine is now
11. Baxter & Farrell, Constructive Discharge - When Quitting Means Getting Fired, 7 EMP.
REL. L.J. 346, 347 (1981) (emphasis omitted).
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1988).
13. Id. at § 158(b)(2).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1988). This section assigns the Board primary responsibility for enforcing
the provisions of the NLRA.
15. See generally Note, Choosing a Standard for Constructive Discharge in Title VII Litigation,
71 CoRam. L. REv. 587 (1986).
16. See Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Company, 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984); Pena v. Brat-
tleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir.
1983); Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897
(11th Cir. 1982); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co.,
646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981); Heagney v. University of Washington, 642 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981);
Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (Ist Cir. 1977); Young v. Southwestern Savings and
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commonly applied in other employment related causes of action. 17
Proof of constructive discharge can have a significant impact on
the relief available to a successful plaintiff. If the employer conduct
that precipitates an employee's resignation is actionable, then the
employee can recover damages, but only up to the time of her res-
ignation. If, however, the employee can establish constructive dis-
charge, she is entitled to recover not only for damages up to the
time of the resignation, but back pay for lost wages occurring after
the termination of employment.18 In some circumstances, discharged
employees are also entitled to receive front pay, which is an award
for damages from the time of the judgment to when the plaintiff
can work himself back into the position he would have been absent
the discrimination.19 Because of the wider range of damages available
to a person who is constructively discharged over one who has merely
resigned, it is obvious that aggrieved former employees wili seek to
invoke the doctrine. 20 It thus becomes critical for both employees
and employers to know when an employer's conduct will sustain a
finding of constructive discharge.
2 1
17. See, e.g., Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990) (Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Kelley v. TYK Refractories, 860 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir. 1988) (§ 1981 civil rights);
Kries v. Townley, 833 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1987) (state employee benefits plan); Weisman v. Connors,
69 Md. App. 732, 519 A.2d 795 (1987) (breach of contract).
18. Goss, 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984).
19. Id. See also Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1985).
20. By way of example, let us assume that a female employee who presently earns $1000 a
month is denied a promotion to a position which pays $1500 a month. Believing that the denial is
due to sex discrimination (assume this belief is correct), she approaches the employer, who becomes
very angry at the suggestion. Soon thereafter the employee begins to observe what she believes are
moves designed to force her to quit, such as a heavier work load and more critical performance
evaluations. After two months of enduring this treatment, she resigns. The lawsuit she files is decided
in her favor ten months after her resignation.
If she cannot establish that she was constructively discharged, her monetary damages are limited
to $1000, which is the extra pay she would have made the two months prior to her resignation had
she received the promotion. If, on the other hand, she can prove constructive discharge, she will
additionally be entitled to receive $1500 a month lost salary for the ten months prior to the judgment
(minus any mitigating earnings, of course), plus reinstatement or front pay until she is able to acquire
a comparable position.
Obviously, a finding of constructive discharge can make quite a difference in a plaintiff's ultimate
recovery.
21. The application of the doctrine can also have a significant impact on procedural aspects
of a case, such as the statute of limitations. For example, in Panopulos v. Westinghouse, 216 Cal.
1050 [Vol. 93
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There are at present two competing standards used by the courts
to decide whether a constructive discharge has occurred. These stan-
dards are commonly referred to as the "employer intent" and "rea-
sonable employee" standards. 22
A. The Employer Intent Standard
1. The NLRA
The employer intent standard originated with discrimination cases
under the NLRA which, as noted previously, was the first area of
employment law to use the constructive discharge doctrine. In Crys-
tal Princeton Refining Co.,23 the National Labor Relations Board
held that in order to prove constructive discharge under the NLRA,
an employee must show that "the burdens upon the employee must
cause, and be intended to cause, a change in his working conditions
so difficult or unpleasant as to force him to resign .... [I]t must
be shown that those burdens were imposed because of the employee's
union activities.' '24 The first element of proof consists of two parts.
First, the employee must show the existence of intolerable working
conditions. Then, if the employee can show that those intolerable
conditions were deliberately imposed upon him by the employer, he
has satisfied the first element.
The second element underscores the fact that the reason(s) un-
derlying the imposition of the intolerable conditions must be un-
lawful. In an NLRA case, the unlawful conduct which satisfies the
App.3d 660, 669-70, 264 Cal. Rptr. 810, 816-17 (1989), the court observed:
The facts of this case present the anomaly that had the plaintiff resigned immediately and
claimed constructive discharge upon his transfer ... he would have had to file suit within
two years, yet plaintiff remained on the job for five years .... While an employee is not
in every case required to resign immediately in order to maintain an action for wrongful
constructive discharge .... the employee may not unilaterally extend his or her right to
sue for an injury already suffered simply by remaining on the job.
Id.
22. These standards are also referred to respectively as the "subjective" and "objective" tests.
As the author finds these terms to be both confusing and somewhat misleading, this article will use
the terms "employer intent" and "reasonable employee."
23. 222 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1976).
24. Id. at 1069.
1991]
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second element is discrimination based upon an employee's union
membership.2 Thus, if an employer deliberately imposes intolerable
conditions on an employee on the basis of some non-proscribed
activity, a personality conflict for example, there will be no con-
structive discharge; there is no underlying violation of the law, since
it not illegal for an employee to be discharged because of a mere
personality conflict.26
Strictly speaking, the second "element" cited above is not a true
element of constructive discharge, but rather the underlying violation
of law which is a prerequisite to a constructive discharge action.
2. Title VII
Although the doctrine has found ready acceptance in Title VII
actions, only a minority of circuits now apply the employer intent
standard in Title VII litigation. The minority jurisdictions now con-
sist of the Fourth27 and Eighth2l Circuits. In these jurisdictions, after
the aggrieved plaintiff has established the underlying violation of
law, she must prove "[1] deliberateness of the employer's action,
and [2] intolerability of the working conditions. ' 29 Deliberateness
is established by demonstrating that the employer desired to force
the employee to quitA0 Intolerability of working conditions is es-
tablished if it can be shown that a reasonable employee would have
found the conditions intolerable.
3'
Of the handful of states which have addressed the issue, Oregon3 2
and California33 have adopted modified versions of the employer
intent standard. Oregon requires a finding of employer intent, but
has relaxed the second element, requiring only that the employee
25. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1988).
26. This is assuming, of course, that the personality conflict itself is not due to any actionable
employer conduct.
27. EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983).
28. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981).
29. Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Bratcher v. Sky Chef's, Inc., 308 Or. 501, 783 P.2d 4 (1989).
33. Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 217 Cal. App.3d 36, 265 Cal. Rptr. 814 (3d Dist. 1990).
[Vol. 931052
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actually find the working conditions intolerable.3 4 Under the Oregon
approach, a 'plaintiff need not show that a reasonable employee
would have felt forced to resign. She merely must establish that she
did in fact resign in the face of employer attempts to oust her.
In California, a plaintiff can establish the requisite mental state
if she demonstrates that "the employer had actual or constructive
knowledge of the intolerable actions and conditions and could have,
but did not, remedy the situation." ' 35 California retains the require-
ment that the working conditions be intolerable to a reasonable em-
ployee.36
All courts, even those which follow the reasonable employee
standard, uniformly agree that a constructive discharge occurs when
an "employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions
so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary res-
ignation .... "3 Courts which have required proof of scienter do
so on the basis of the deliberateness requirement. "To act delib-
erately, of course, requires intent." ' 3
8
In Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc. 39 the Fourth Circuit noted that
intent could be inferred from circumstantial evidence. 0 According
to the court, intent can be inferred when an employer fails to act
in the face of intolerable conditions. 41 The court cautioned, however,
that "where all employees are treated identically, no one employee
can claim that difficult working conditions signify the employer's
intent to force that individual to resign.''42
The California Third District Court of Appeal reached a similar
conclusion in Gantt v. Sentry Insurance,43 commenting that
34. Bratcher, 308 Or. at 506, 788 P.2d at 6.
35. Gantt, at 217 Cal. App.3d at 66, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
36. Id. at n.18.
37. Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan Association, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975).
The quoted language appears almost uniformly in constructive discharge cases, but it is significant
that it appears in Young, a seminal case adopting the reasonable employee standard.
38. Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 1984).
39. 770 F.2d 1251 (1985).
40. Id. at 1255.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981)).
43. 217 Cal. App.3d 36, 265 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1990).
10531991]
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"[w]ithout some culpable mental state on the part of the employer
the tort would be converted in essence to a form of strict liability
for the creation of intolerable conditions.' '44
Both Bristow and Gantt demonstrate that courts using the em-
ployer intent standard (or some modified version thereof) are aware
of the difficulty plaintiffs encounter in proving intent. 45 Their re-
sponse is -to allow proof by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence
can include showing that the employer knew of the intolerable work-
ing conditions, but failed to do anything about them.
B. The Reasonable Employee Standard
Most of the circuits which have absorbed the doctrine into Title
VII now employ the reasonable employee standard in determining
whether an employee has been constructively discharged. These cir-
cuits include the First,4 Second,47 Third,48 Fifth, 49 Sixth, 50 Ninth,5'
Tenth,52 Eleventh, 53 and the District of Columbia.5 4 Only the Seventh
Circuit has yet to take sides on the issue. Maryland, 55 Illinois5 6 and
Washington5 7 have also thrown their hats into the reasonable em-
ployee ring. Additionally, Pennsylvania appears to be leaning in this
direction too.58
44. Id. at 217, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
45. It should be noted that the Gantt court claimed not to be adopting an employer intent
standard, but held that a constructive discharge claim does require the evidence to show that the
employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the intolerable conditions and could have, but
didn't, remedy the situation. Nonetheless, the Gantt test is virtually indistinguishable from Bristow,
since both authorize proof of scienter through the use of circumstantial evidence.
46. Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (lst Cir. 1977).
47. Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1983).
48. Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1984).
49. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980).
50. Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982).
51. Heagney v. Univ. of Washington, 642 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981).
52. Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340 (10th Cir. 1986).
53. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
54. Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
55. Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 59 Md. App. 642, 477 A.2d 1197 (1984).
56. Steele v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 160 I11. App.3d 577, 112 II1. Dec. 568, 513 N.E.2d
1177 (1987).
57. Bulaich v. AT & T Information Systems, 113 Wash.2d 254, 778 P.2d 1031 (1989).
58. Hanson v. Penn. Dep't of Transp., 130 Pa. Comnw. 499, 568 A.2d 991 (1990).
1054
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According to this approach, "the question on which constructive
discharge cases turn is simply whether the employer, by its illegal
discriminatory acts, has made working conditions so difficult that
a reasonable person in the employee's position would feel compelled
to resign.' '59 Thus, the reasonable employee standard specifically re-
jects the notion that employees must prove scienter. A plaintiff need
only prove that his actions were consistent with what a reasonable
employee would have done in the same circumstances.60
Although the reasonable employee standard has achieved sig-
nificant acceptance, there is scant discussion as to why this is so.
At times the courts seem to view it as self evident that the reasonable
employee standard is superior to that of employer intent. For in-
stance, in Bourque v. Powell Electrical Mfg. Co. 61 the Fifth Circuit
dismissed the employer intent standard as "inconsistent ... with
the realities of modern employment. "62 The court failed, however,
to articulate those realities. In most of the other decisions adopting
the reasonable employee standard, the courts have failed to articulate
any reason for choosing this test, other than to cite precedent from
other jurisdictions.
In Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp.,6 the Tenth Circuit did devote some
discussion to the justifications for the reasonable employee standard.
The court observed that "typically proof of any element in these
cases is circumstantial."64 The reasonable employee standard "cut[s]
through the details and difficulty of analyzing the employer's state
of mind and focus[es] on an objective standard. ' 65 Quoting Clark
v. Marsh,66 a decision from the District of Columbia Circuit, the
Tenth Circuit noted that .'.[t]o the extent that [the employer] denies
a conscious design to force [the employee] to resign, we note that
an employer's subjective intent is irrelevant; [the employer] must be
59. Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986).
60. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 65.
63. 796 F.2d 340 (1986).
64. Id. at 344.
65. Id.
66. 665 F.2d 1168 (1981).
1991]
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held to have intended those consequences it could reasonably have
foreseen."'67
The court then opined that the reasonable employee standard
"will simplify the task of the finder of fact in determining not only
whether the employer discriminated against the employee but also
whether the manner of discrimination rendered work conditions in-
tolerable. '"68
Based on the discussion in Derr, there appear to be at least three
policy reasons favoring the adoption of this standard: [1] because
proof is often based on circumstantial evidence, scienter is too dif-
ficult to establish; [2] because of the difficulty of proof, employers
will be rewarded for injurious conduct even though the results of
such conduct were foreseeable; and [3] use of an objective standard
simplifies the task of the fact-finder.
III. WEST ViRGnA LAW ON CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
Discussion of the current status of West Virginia law on con-
structive discharge does not present a difficult problem. There is
none.69 The issue has been raised in only one case to reach the
Supreme Court of Appeals, Chico Dairy v. West Virginia Human
Rights Comm'n 70 The court, however, did not address the construc-
tive discharge issue because it found as a matter of law that there
had been no underlying violation of law. Lacking a substantive vi-
olation of law, it was unnecessary for the court to discuss the issue
of constructive discharge.
67. Derr v. Gulf Oil Co., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting Clark v. Marsh, 665
F.2d 1168, 1175 n.8) (emphasis omitted).
68. Id.
69. There is some law in West Virginia concerning a resigning employee's ability to collect
unemployment compensation. See e.g., Curry v. Gatson, 376 S.E.2d 166 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that
racial or sexual harrassment in the workplace which would cause a reasonably prudent person to
resign will not disqualify former employee from receiving unemployment compensation benefits upon
resignation).
70. 382 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1989).
1056 [Vol. 93
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IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR EMPLOYER INTENT
A. The Ends Determine the Means
Any decision as to what standard to apply should necessarily
depend on which standard best accomplishes the purposes of the
constructive discharge doctrine.
The policy which forms the foundation for the constructive dis-
charge doctrine is the desire by the courts to prevent employers from
accomplishing covertly that which they are prohibited by law from
doing overtly. Stated in other terms, the doctrine's purpose is to
prevent an employer from making a mockery of employees' legal
protections by having an employee voluntarily acquiesce to an em-
ployer's legally unjustified desire to end the employment relation-
ship. As one court commented:
It would defy both reason and fairness to immunize [an employer] from liability
simply because he has been clever enough to [effectively fire an employee] by
forcing a resignation. That would, in effect, reward him for the extra measure
of malefaction of not only acting in contravention of some public policy but of
making things so intolerable that the employee is forced to initiate his own un-
lawful termination.71
It is important to note that the purpose of constructive discharge
is not to provide employees with expanded substantive employment
rights, but rather to allow them a mechanism to better enforce the
rights they already possess. It should also be remembered that ap-
plication of the doctrine merely affects the scope of recovery, and
not liability for the underlying unlawful conduct.
Courts have also expressed a desire, to the extent possible, to
have disputes solved within existing employment relationships.7 2 Thus,
courts should apply a standard which will prevent employer sub-
71. Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 59 Md. App. 642, 653, 477 A.2d 1197, 1203 (1984).
72. See Derr v. Gulf Oil, 796 F.2d 340, 342 (10th Cir. 1986); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg.
Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980).
1991] 1057
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terfuge and encourage settlements of disputes while the employment
relationship is still intact.
B. The Means to the Ends
With the foregoing discussion in mind, it is the author's con-
tention that the employer intent standard is most consistent with the
purposes that the constructive discharge is designed to serve. This
contention is based on three premises: (1) the doctrine is designed
to prevent intentional misconduct, hence scienter is an indispensable
element; (2) since intent may be inferred through circumstantial ev-
idence, plaintiffs do not face insurmountable problems with proof;
and (3) by allowing inferences of intent based on employer inaction
to known, intolerable conditions, aggrieved employees (or their
agents) will be encouraged to make employers aware of their com-
plaints. Employers who are not trying to force an employee out will
remedy the work conditions, thus fostering settlement of disputes
within the employment relationship.
At first blush, one may wonder why there is even a debate about
whether intent should be required in a constructive discharge action.
After all, the doctrine was designed to combat employers who force
employees whom they cannot lawfully fire to resign. If the behavior
at issue is intentional misconduct, then it is nonsensical to fail to
require proof of intent.
Supporters of the reasonable employee standard argue that re-
quiring proof of scienter presents too difficult a burden for plain-
tiffs. In Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp.,73 for instance, the Tenth Circuit
admitted it was concerned about the "difficulty of analyzing the
employer's state of mind .... . 74Such a statement is merely a dip-
lomatic way of saying "because scienter is so difficult to prove, it
need not be proven at all."
The answer to the plaintiff's dilemma need not be made at the
expense of justice. Use of circumstantial evidence can provide a
73. 796 F.2d 340 (1986).
74. Id. at 344.
1058 [Vol. 93
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viable vehicle for proving scienter. The California court which de-
cided Gantt was on the mark when it said that intent could be
inferred from an employer's failure to remedy intolerable conditions
of which it has actual or constructive knowledge. 75
Allowing such an inference enhances a plaintiff's chance of suc-
cess at trial and simultaneously encourages dispute settlement while
the employment relationship is still in existence. If the employee
approaches the employer and it responds positively to correct her
legitimate concerns, the dispute is resolved and no further action
will be necessary. On the other hand, an employer's refusal to re-
spond to an employee's legitimate concerns will create a strong in-
ference that the employer intended to impose the challenged practices.
Retaining the element of scienter and creating a strong inference of
intent upon an employer's failure to address an employee's concerns
over her working conditions provides the means with which courts
can uphold the ends of the constructive discharge doctrine.
With the foregoing discussion in mind, the author suggests the
following analytical framework for determining when a constructive
discharge has occurred: First, the employee must establish the un-
derlying violation of law; second, the plaintiff must establish that
she was working under conditions that a reasonable employee would
consider intolerable; third, she must demonstrate, through direct or
circumstantial evidence, that the employer intended to impose the
intolerable conditions upon her. Intent will be inferred when the
employer was or should have been put on notice (either from the
employee or some third party) that the employee's working con-
ditions were intolerable.
An employee who establishes the first element will be entitled to
recover for damages up to the time of her resignation. Proof of the
latter two elements will entitle the resignation to be treated as a
discharge, permitting the employee to recover damages accordingly.
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of constructive discharge provides a necessary
mechanism for protecting employees from employer subterfuge. It
75. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 217 Cal. App.3d 36, 66, 265 Cal. Rptr. 814, 833 (3d Dist. 1990).
10591991]
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prevents employers from doing covertly that which they are pro-
hibited form doing overtly, i.e., discharge employees on unlawful
grounds. Such a goal is noble. But in seeking to thwart such schemes,
courts should be careful not to impose liability on employers for
acts which they did not intend, particularly since the situations in
which these cases arise involve intentional misconduct.
West Virginia, and other jurisdictions which have yet to address
this issue, should adopt the means which most effectively executes
the ends of the doctrine. The employer intent standard is the most
effective means. Courts can require scienter and simultaneously allay
the plaintiff's concerns about the difficulty of proof by the use of
inferences. Such a standard will not only effectively establish intent,
it will often encourage the resolution of disputes before a termi-
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